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Abstract 
 
This article is an extended version of a speech delivered during the Conference on Judicial 
Cooperation Techniques for the Protection of European Fundamental Rights: Past and Future 
Prospectives held in EUI on 9-10 May 2014. It deals with the possibility of maintaining coexisting 
national and Charter standards of fundamental rights and with the importance of cooperation between 
the ECJ and the national courts when fundamental rights protection is at stake. 
 
In this article, possible approaches to the relation between the constitutional and Charter standards of 
fundamental rights are discussed, and the implications of the approach adopted by the ECJ are 
examined. Furthermore, the current and potential importance of the constitutional identity of the 
Member States is analyzed. 
Keywords 
 
 
ECJ, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, dialogue between EU and national courts, Åkerberg Fransson 
judgment, Melloni judgment
 1 
Introduction 
 
Fundamental rights are – without doubt – an important element of the dialogue between the European 
Court of Justice (the ‘ECJ’) and the national courts, in particular the supreme and constitutional courts. 
It would be at the same time very difficult to find a more complex aspect of this dialogue, given that 
the fundamental rights debate concentrates not only on the correct interpretation of law but also and 
first of all on the division of competences between European and national judges. The reason for 
potential disputes related to these questions is rather simple and almost self-evident: the ECJ as well as 
the national constitutional courts are the very guarantors of the respect of fundamental rights and that 
function is enshrined in the ethos of each supreme jurisdiction.  
In this sense the competence with regard to fundamental rights necessarily imparts the legitimization 
of the constitutional status of supreme national jurisdictions.  
For the ECJ, fundamental rights are an extremely important part of the ‘acquis communautaire’ and an 
essential component of the European identity. Human rights have been introduced into the sphere of 
European law as a substantial element of the general principles almost 50 years ago
1
. However, from 
today’s perspective, there is no doubt that the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(the ‘Charter’) as binding law on 1st December 20092 had a specific symbolic significance for the 
European Union, as a clear confirmation of the trends developed by the jurisprudence. What is more, it 
helped a lot to stimulate further development of the legal order and the process of integration as a 
whole. It has been the starting point for a new stage of the human rights jurisprudence of the ECJ. 
Today, almost 5 years later, we may say that the quality, scope and frequency of the application of 
fundamental rights essentially changed the face of the Court’s jurisprudence. The ECJ has become the 
court of human rights for the European Union. How significant the impact of the formal act of 
including the Charter into the legal order of the EU would be on the whole EU legal system, was 
difficult to foresee. 
Taking into account fundamental rights in the interpretation and application of EU norms is a crucial 
factor for the shaping of the legal order because it opens new ways of legal reasoning and 
methodology. It also allows judges to recognize more easily the purpose of certain legal mechanisms 
and their interdependency. For these reasons, no supreme jurisdiction, neither at the national nor at the 
supranational level, may execute their functions without referring to fundamental rights and to the 
general principles of law. My personal experiences confirm this assumption.  
                                                     
1  Cf. Judgment of 4 February 1959 in the case Friedrich Stork et Cie v. High Autority, (1/58) [1959] ECR 43 and the 
judgment of 12 November 1969 in the case Stauder v. City of Ulm (29/69) [1969] ECR 419. 
2  [2012] OJ C362/02. 
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As a former constitutional judge, I can firmly say that the openness towards fundamental rights 
protection and to the general principles of law were – at the first stage after the collapse of the 
communist system in my country – the very vehicle of transformation of the legal system. At the time 
they created substantive ‘added values’ to the concept of the rule of law. A similar impact of 
fundamental rights on the role of constitutional jurisprudence has also been observed in other national 
orders, where the totalitarian rule has paralyzed democratic development of society for many years (in 
Germany, Spain, Hungary, etc.). No doubt the application of fundamental rights standards was the 
most important aspect of the role which these jurisdictions played in the national systems. 
As a European judge, I should assert that references to the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Charter have not only become current practice in the jurisprudence but are also a necessary element of 
the interpretation and the application of European provisions. Judgments  such  as, in recent years, 
NS
3
, DEB
4
, Åkerberg Fransson
5
, Melloni
6
, Jeremy F.
7
, Trade Agency
8
 and many others, are good 
illustrations of this phenomenon. References made in the jurisprudence to the guarantees of 
fundamental rights are not simply ornamental. They influence the process of interpretation, of 
determination of the very content of particular norms, their extent and legal consequences, and thus 
they provide for the enlargement of the field of application of the European rules in the national legal 
orders. 
When fundamental rights protection is taken seriously, both at the European and at the national level, 
we are confronted with competing jurisdictions, each of them embodying their own ethos of 
fundamental rights scrutiny
9
. Being founded on the same axiological background, the constitutional 
values and those expressed by the Charter are very similar. However, this common source does not 
ensure uniformity of the Member States’ constitutional standards. The differences reside not only in 
the content of a particular guarantee but also in a diverse hierarchy established between particular 
rights and freedoms. The approach to the relations between the right to privacy on the one hand and to 
the freedom of expression on the other hand, constitutes a perfect example. The limitations of these 
rights determined by the principle of proportionality are not the same in all national legal orders and 
                                                     
3  Judgment of 21 December 2011 in joined cases N.S. and Others (C-411/10 and C-493/10) [2011] ECR I-0000. 
4  Judgment of 22 December 2010 in case DEB v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C-279/09) [2010] ECR I-13849. 
5  Judgment of 26 February 2013 in case Åkerberg Fransson (C-617/10) [2013] ECR I-0000. 
6  Judgment of 26 February 2013 in case Melloni (C-399/11) [2013] ECR I-0000. 
7  Judgment of 30 May 2013 in case Jeremy F. (C-168/13). 
8  Judgment of 6 September 2012 in case Trade Agency (C-619/10) [2012] ECR I-0000. 
9  The specific issues related to the application of the standards enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights 
(‘ECHR’) and the relations between ECJ and ECtHR after envisaged ratification of the European Convention by the 
European Union are not the subject of my analysis in this essay. The topic merits a separate presentation. 
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the scope of the admissible interferences with these rights depends on the axiological concepts 
accepted in a given national legal system.
10
       
The European legal space is based on a pluralism of national legal systems, including a diversity of 
fundamental rights standards guaranteed by the constitutional provisions of each Member State. The 
idea of diversity is beautiful and at the same time very appealing because it allows – at least 
theoretically – to combine completely different components: on the one hand, the concept of a more 
and more integrated  European space of law and, on the other hand, the national and constitutional  
identity  of each Member State.  
Nevertheless, diversity is not only extremely difficult to achieve in practice but also carries a risk to 
the coherence and effectiveness of EU law. A greater margin of autonomy  allowing to shape the 
standards of basic rights protection seems more risky for the coherence and the effectiveness of the 
European rules and  vice versa. The fragility of the equilibrium between the two above mentioned 
components (coherence and pluralism) is reflected in the recent jurisprudence of the constitutional 
courts. It is not necessary to describe in detail the well-known and  largely discussed decisions of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court issuing a ‘warning’ aimed at preventing interferences with the 
German constitutional identity, that the ECJ’s ultra vires jurisprudence going beyond the 
competencies attributed to that jurisdiction could constitute
11
. Less known but very strong and clear in 
their messages are the relatively recent decisions of the Czech
12
 and the Polish
13
 Constitutional Courts 
in which the priority of the constitutional standards of fundamental rights protection over the European 
standards was expressly underlined. In the former case, which concerned Slovak Pensions, the Czech 
Constitutional Court expressly recognized that the interpretation of the standard of protection 
stemming from the ECJ jurisprudence was erroneous and for this reason should not be applied. In the 
latter case, the Polish Constitutional Court accepted its own competence to perform the constitutional 
review of EU Regulations on the basis of the constitutional guarantees related to the right to fair trial 
and consequently admitted theoretically its own prerogative to suspend the binding force of a 
European Regulation – in this case the Brussels I Regulation14 – on the Polish territory, if its non-
conformity with the Polish Constitution has been established. 
                                                     
10  It explains, to some degree, why the recent judgment of the ECJ in case Google Spain and Google Inc. (C-131/12), 
judgment of 18 May 2014, provoked such different reactions and commentaries in the Anglo-Saxon and continental 
newspapers. The former represent a culture more focused on the freedom of expression, while the latter – on the right to 
privacy.     
11  Cf. Judgments of German Federal Constitutional Court of 6 July 201, Honeywell, 2 BvR 2661/06, and of 24 April 2013, 
Counter-Terrorisme Database, 1 BvR1215/07. 
12  Cf. Judgment of Czech Constitutional Court of 31 January 2012, Pl. ÚS 5/12: Slovak Pensions. 
13  Cf. Judgment of Polish Constitutional Court of 16 November 2011, SK 45/09, Brussels I.  
14  Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters. 
Marek Safjan 
4 
It is not my intention to present in these short remarks the complexity of the relations between the two 
legal orders. I would rather like to focus my observations on the issue of coexistence of the 
constitutional and the Charter standards of fundamental rights when the latter is applicable to the 
national legal provisions which implement EU law. In this field, a potential confrontation between 
these standards is clearly visible and the question of coexistence and its necessary premises becomes 
particularly important. 
 
Possible scenarios 
Theoretically, three different scenarios which describe the diverse approaches to the question of 
relations between the constitutional and the Charter standards of fundamental rights may be described. 
The ‘sense or non-sense’ of the dialogue between the national and European jurisdictions has to be 
examined, because in each of these scenarios there appears to be a different degree of potential risk of 
collision and tensions between the different courts. The distinguishing criterion is the scope of 
application of the Charter in the field covered by national legal acts
15
 which are in principle the subject 
of the national constitutional review. 
A restrictive approach limits the application of the Charter to the national provisions which have been 
adopted specifically for the purposes of the implementation of EU law.  
An abstract approach, completely opposite to the above mentioned one, extends the application of the 
Charter to each part of the national law which generally belongs to the legal field covered by the 
European provisions, however, no concrete connection between national and EU law can be 
identified
16
. As an example one could refer to the bulk of environmental law, agriculture or public 
health.  
A functional approach, located half way between the restrictive and the abstract approach, constitutes 
a kind of compromise between these two. From the restrictive approach this concept differs insofar as 
it concerns not only the specific provisions adopted specifically for implementation purposes but also 
other national provisions, which are necessary to ensure an effective application of the European 
provisions. From the abstract approach this concept differs because it does not content itself with a 
general and abstract connection between EU and national provisions but, quite to the contrary, requires 
                                                     
15  Cf. Art. 51(1) of the Charter reads as follows: “The provisions of this Charter are addressed (…) to the Member States 
only when they are implementing Union law. (...)”. Cf. regarding Article 51 of the Charter, K. Lenaerts, Exploring the 
Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in European Constitutional Law Review (2012), p. 375; and D. 
Sarmiento, Who’s afraid of the Charter? The Court of Justice, national courts and the new framework of fundamental 
rights protection in Europe, CMLR, 2013, p. 1267; and also M. Safjan, Areas of application of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union: fields of conflict?, EUI Working Papers, no. 22 (2011). 
16  Cf. Judgements in cases: Maurin (C-144/95) [1996] ECR I-2909 (para. 11-12); Iida (C-40/11) [2012] ECR (para. 79); 
Ymeraga and Others (C-87/12) [2013] ECR (para. 41); Siragusa (C-206/13), judgment of 6 March 2013 (para. 26-27) 
which can to same extend illustrate this approach. 
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the indication of a concrete, precisely identified rule of EU law applicable within the scope of national 
law, so that the Charter could be applied
17
. 
It is clear that each of these theoretical approaches represent a different potential for the constitutional 
dialogue between the national and EU jurisdictions. The  scope of application of the Charter, on the 
one hand, and the scope of application of the constitutional standards on the other hand constitute 
‘communicating vessels’ in the sense  that,  in principle, the larger the application of the Charter, the  
narrower the field of operation left for the constitutional standards of fundamental rights, and vice 
versa. The two extreme approaches capture the interdependence perfectly: the restrictive approach to 
the Charter leaves a large space for the constitutional standards and the abstract approach in fact 
strongly limits the potential field of application of these standards. The functional approach makes the 
coexistence of the two systems of fundamental rights standards possible. 
In recent ECJ case law, the trend towards a larger application of the Charter guarantees is rather 
evident. Nevertheless, the pure abstract approach was rejected. It is manifested by a series of 
judgments adopting a functional approach to the concept of implementation of European law into 
national legal orders
18
. The radiation of the EU law on the national legal systems allows for the 
application of the Charter to national provisions which were not established to implement EU law but 
are necessary to ensure an effective application of the European provisions. In that sense, the 
Åkerberg Fransson judgment
19
 is the result, and the confirmation by the Great Chamber of the ECJ, of 
a consequent adherence to the functional approach in the case law established in the former ECJ 
jurisprudence
20
. 
                                                     
17  Cf. Judgment of 5 October 2010 in case McB. (C-400/10 PPU) [2010] ECR I-8965, and in the case DEB v. 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C-279/09), above at (4). 
18  Cf. Judgment in case McB. (C-400/10 PPU), above at (17) and in the case DEB v Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
(C-279/09), above at (4).  
19  Cf. Judgment in case Åkerberg Fransson (C-617/10), above at (5). 
20  Cf. the case-law cited in Åkerberg Fransson. At the same time it would not be right to see some essential, revolutionary 
change in the scope of application of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter in relation to the national 
regulations. The ECJ maintains a stance that, in accordance with its Art. 51, the application of the Charter always requires 
to establish which EU legal provision is applied and interpreted in the national legal order. Such requirements have not 
been met in case Siragusa (C-206/13), judgment of 6 March 2014, in which the ECJ declared its incompetence due to a 
lack of a sufficient linking point between EU law and Italian law concerning the landscape protection. This judgment is 
not a withdrawal from Åkerberg Fransson line but a confirmation of the criteria of the application of them Charter 
adopted therein. Similarly, the case Pfleger e.a. (C-390/12), judgment of 30 April 2014, in which the ECJ concluded it 
was unnecessary to carry out an analysis in the scope of the Charter in view of a possible infringement of Art. 56 TFEU 
by a national regulation (para. 60) – cannot be considered as a ‘retreat’ from the Åkerberg Fransson line. As for the 
requirement of a link between the Charter and European law, see also A. Rosas, When is the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights applicable at national level, Jurisprudence, vol. no. 4, p.1269, and ‘Implementing’ EU law in the Member States: 
some observations on the applicability of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in L’Europe des droits fondamentaux, 
Hommage à Albert Weitzel, Pedone, 2013; and also A. Rosas, H. Kaila, L’application de la Charte des droits 
fondamentaux de l’Union européenne par la Cour de Justice: un premier bilan, Il Dritto dell’Unione Europea, 2011, 1, p. 
8 and T. von Danwitz, L’autonomie du droit de l’Union et la mise en œuvre de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de 
l`Union européenne, in Mélanges en l’honneur de C. Blumann, Bruylant, in print. 
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It must be recalled that this judgment has been adopted with regard to Swedish law, which was the 
legal basis for two procedures: criminal and administrative, initiated against Mr Åkerberg Fransson, 
who infringed the duty to pay VAT and in this context also committed a fraud. With regard to the two 
procedures related to the same facts, the ECJ interpreted the ne bis in idem principle, despite the fact 
that the national legal acts have not been adopted for the purpose of the implementation of EU law
21
. 
The judgment expressly stresses that even national provisions adopted without any connection (direct 
or indirect) with EU law have to observe the Charter standards if they are to serve as national 
instruments in implementing European law
22, and in that sense it’s a clear example of the functional 
approach to the application of the Charter in the case law. The consequence of this approach is that a 
high number of national laws could be covered by a potential application of the Charter. In such a 
landscape, is there still space for a dialogue between the European and national jurisdictions?  
It would be very hard to deny that the national legal acts which are potentially the subject of 
evaluation from the Charter perspective could also be the subject of the constitutional review from the 
point of view of application of fundamental rights. Is it not a kind of a specific ‘dictate’ of the Charter 
standards imposed by the principle of primacy of EU law which can marginalize the role of the 
Constitutional Courts in their sphere of activity thus depriving them of the most important part of their 
prerogatives, that is, the interpretation of the fundamental rights standards that are to be applied in the 
course of the constitutional review?  
The approach stressing the exclusive application of the Charter standards of fundamental rights in such 
a situation seemed, before the Åkerberg Fransson judgment, the only possible scenario.  
From this perspective the importance of the Åkerberg Fransson judgment is significant because the 
space for the application of the national constitutional standards to the national provisions 
implementing EU law was expressly stated
23
.  However, it does not concern all the potential situations 
(hypothesis) in which this specific overlap of the fundamental rights standards may appear. 
Firstly, it may concern situations in which the European lawmaker has left a large margin of 
appreciation to the national legislators to shape adequate national instruments which are necessary for 
                                                     
21  Cf. Opinion of the Advocate General J. Kokott delivered on 15 December 2011 in the case Bonda (C-489/10) [2012] 
ECR, who stressed, that the notion of ‘implementation’ relates not only to the national acts which were adopted explicitly 
when the Member State implements EU law but also to the acts which already existed (see para. 20). 
22  Cf. Judgment in case Åkerberg Fransson (C-617/10), above at (5), (para. 29). 
23  Cf. Judgment in case Åkerberg Fransson (C-617/10), above at (5), (para. 29-30), reads as follows: “29. That said, where 
a court of a Member State is called upon to review whether fundamental rights are complied with by a national provision 
or measure which, in a situation where action of the Member States is not entirely determined by European Union law, 
implements the latter for the purposes of Article 51(1) of the Charter, national authorities and courts remain free to apply 
national standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, 
as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of European Union law are not thereby 
compromised (…). 30. For this purpose, where national courts find it necessary to interpret the Charter they may, and in 
some cases must, make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU.” 
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the effective application of EU law. Exactly, such a situation occurred in the context of Swedish law in 
the Åkerberg Fransson case. EU law did not determine exhaustively the scope and the sanctions 
related to the responsibility for non-payment of VAT, imposing on the national lawmakers the duty to 
establish, in the framework of their own competence, the necessary legal acts including administrative 
or criminal procedures
24
. 
Secondly, the application of the national constitutional standards becomes possible when the threefold 
condition is met that primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are observed. This solution seems to 
allow achieving two different goals at once, a wide application of the Charter on the one hand, and 
room for the Constitutional standards, on the other hand. This opens a potential dialogue between the 
national and European courts in this field. While this approach is very appealing, we cannot avoid 
addressing complex questions which arise in this matter and which show not only the positive effects 
of this concept but also some negative ones or, at least, complicated dilemmas.  
These questions relate, as indicated above, to the area where the national and the Charter standards of 
fundamental rights may potentially overlap. We should recall that the mere existence in the national 
order of a standard of protection of a fundamental right which would be higher than that under EU 
law, does not in itself determine the choice in favor of the national guarantees
25
. The concept adopted 
in EU law in this regard
26
 differs from the European Convention of Human Rights
27
, which 
automatically imposes the application of the higher standard of protection whenever there is 
competition between two standards, i.e. conventional and constitutional (national). The conditions 
mentioned in the Åkerberg Fransson judgment, necessary for the application of constitutional 
standards of fundamental rights, directly refer to the hypothesis in which a national standard was 
higher than the one adopted in EU law
28
. For this reason it must be asked whether not only the higher 
                                                     
24  A contrario, are not at issue national legal acts which constitute only a technical, necessary component of the legal rules 
contained in a EU legal act which decided upon all important elements of a given solution. 
25  Cf. Judgment in case Melloni (C-399/11), above at (6), in which this option was definitively rejected (para. 63). 
26  Cf. Art. 53 of the Charter which reads as follows: “Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely 
affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by Union law 
and international law and by international agreements to which the Union or all the Member States are party, including 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States 
‘constitutions’.” 
27  According to Art. 53 ECHR the use of a higher standard of fundamental rights protection  is a justification against the use 
of the ECHR standard. Cf. with reference: C. Ladenburger, European Institutional Report, in J. Laffranque (ed.), The 
Protection of Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon, FIDE XXV Congress, Vol. 1, Tartu, Tartu University Press, 2012, at 175 
and S. Iglesias Sánchez, The Court and the Charter: The impact of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on the ECJ’s 
approach to fundamental rights, (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 1565, at 1605. 
28  The situation evaluated in the Åkerberg Fransson case was that the ne bis in idem protection of an individual by the 
Swedish law was stronger than the one required by the Charter. The guarantees steaming from the ECHR jurisprudence 
on Art. 4 of the Protocole 7 ECHR (Cf. ECtHR, case Sergey Zolotoukhine v. Russia, judgment of 10 February 2009, no. 
14939/03, ECHR 2009), were enshrined in the Swedish constitutional system, what excluded the possibility of criminal 
and administrative proceedings in the same case. The standard elaborated on Art.50 of the Charter is not so protective, 
allowing – conformingly to the test established in the Engel judgment (Cf. ECtHR, case Engel and others v. The 
Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, no. 5370/72, Series A, No. 22.) – parallel administrative and criminal 
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standards of protection of the human rights but also these which ensure the same or similar levels of 
protection may be applied, when the conditions established by the Åkerberg Fransson case are met? 
Should the answer be positive, another question arises, namely what are the criteria to qualify the 
standards as representing the same level of protection?  
The answer is only apparently simple and evident. These questions do not cause complications only in 
the ‘ideal legal space’. Different constellations have to be considered, for instance that the national 
constitution ensures the same content of the guarantees, but sets up its own unique hierarchy in 
relation to other fundamental rights; that the scope of protection is the same but the proportionality 
principle applied in the national context allows deeper interference into fundamental rights than would 
be admissible on the basis of the EU provisions; finally, that the normative content of the rights is 
similar although some components of a particular right are differently applied in the constitutional and 
European jurisprudence. A good example is the ne bis in idem principle itself, because – being 
expressed in some legal systems in the identical formula – it is frequently differently interpreted in 
such substantive elements as the notions of ‘penalty’ or ‘criminal procedure’. These few examples 
show that perfect similarity, or even comparability, between the national and European level of 
protection is a hypothesis which is not easily attainable.  
One thing seems to be uncontroversial: the level of protection in the national systems cannot be lower 
than the one guaranteed by the Charter. In this sense, even with the application of the national 
constitutional standards the Charter constitutes a very minimal level of protection which should be 
observed in all cases. But in reality even this thesis can face some of the above mentioned problems. 
The approach adopted in recent ECJ jurisprudence has opened up a new perspective of coexistence 
between the national and European legal orders but it is not free from risk for the coherence and 
uniformity of the interpretation of fundamental rights in relation to EU provisions. However, it should 
be asked what its practical implications for the national judges could be.  
Firstly, it is recommended to focus the analysis on the results of the application of fundamental rights 
and not on their normative and formal content. In fact, only the final effect of the application (meaning 
the degree of protection of a concrete fundamental right, taking into account its place in the entire 
legal system, established jurisprudence and admissible limitations according to the proportionality 
principle) should be relevant for the finding of similarity between the national and Charter standards 
of fundamental rights.  
Secondly, the existence of a long and well-established line of jurisprudence in EU law regarding a 
particular fundamental right constitutes a strong argument or even a kind of presumption in favour of 
the application of the Charter rather than of the constitutional standards of fundamental rights. The risk 
(Contd.)                                                                  
proceedings. However, in the Swedish legal system the higher standard of protection of fundamental rights, based on a 
constitutional standard steaming from the Zolotoukhine jurisprudence, might be applied. 
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of a potential conflict between the requirements of the uniform application of fundamental rights 
would then be smaller.  
A firm position of the ECJ, shaped during the long development of the jurisprudence, may constitute 
an important component of the common constitutional traditions of the Member States. However, 
when at the EU level there is no legislative consensus on the scale and the content of the protected 
values contained in the particular fundamental right the field of diversification of the fundamental 
rights standards becomes wide open because constitutional standards of protection of fundamental 
rights come into play. For this reason the following observation made by Koen Lenaerts can be 
accepted:   
“(…) pluralism is not an absolute value, the level of protection granted to a fundamental right by a 
national legal order must comply with any constitutional consensus that exists at EU level (…) It is the 
existence or absence of an EU legislative consensus that indicates whether the Member States are 
developing at the same pace and in the same manner or whether national societies are evolving in 
accordance with their own scale of values. That being said, national diversity and EU legislative 
consensus must both comply with values which are regarded as pan-European, i.e. those that are the 
object of a constitutional consensus at EU level” 29. 
In conclusion on this point, I would say that, in the current landscape, the dialogue between 
Constitutional and European Courts has become more useful and necessary than before. The existence 
of a grey zone of potential competition between two separate orders now is not only a hypothesis but 
actually part of the reality. One has to accept this ‘grey zone’ as an inevitable secondary effect of the 
recent jurisprudence of the ECJ if the approach of extending the scope of constitutional dialogue 
between the European and national jurisdictions is maintained. This dialogue is not easy because – as 
mentioned above – even the comparability of the guarantees present a great challenge for the judges 
who must decide on the national procedures. 
It is worth noting that the effectiveness of the EU provisions is not a unique determinant for the choice 
between the Charter and constitutional standards
30
. In fact, some recent decisions of the ECJ confirm 
that the efficiency of the EU provisions must give way to the protection of substantive elements of the 
guarantees provided by the Charter
31
. This is why the primary criterion to gauge a standard of 
fundamental rights is the preservation of the essence of fundamental rights. One cannot preclude a 
                                                     
29  Cf. also K. Lenaerts, EU Values and Constitutional Pluralism, a lecture delivered at Warsaw University on 11 April 
2014.  
30  Cf. M. Safjan and D. Düsterhaus, A Union of Effective Judicial Protection, 33 Yearbook of European Law  (2014), 
forthcoming.  
31  Cf. in particular judgments in cases: Krombach (C-7/98) [2000] ECR I-1935; Trade Agency (C-619/10), above at (8); 
Banif Plus Bank (C-472/11) [2013] ECR I-0000. In these judgments the ECJ concluded that the fundamental elements 
constituting protection of the right to fair trial must be respected even at the cost of lower efficiency of a European 
regulation in a given case. 
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priori that the national constitutional standard can provide better guarantees for the preservation of the 
substance of a particular fundamental right than the Charter standard
32
. 
I believe that the recent jurisprudence of the ECJ has left a relatively large discretion to the 
constitutional courts, in which they may effectively operate and exert influence on the ECJ 
jurisprudence. The dialogue can guarantee the participation of the national supreme courts in the 
shaping of the standards of protection required by the Charter, which are to be interpreted with respect 
to the constitutional traditions of the Members States. In fact, Article 52(4) of the Charter imposes the 
respect for the constitutional traditions of the Member States when the Charter is applied.  
However, so that the dialogue is efficient, at least two conditions are to be met. Firstly, according to 
para. 29 of the Åkerberg Fransson judgment
33
, the exchange between the ECJ and national judges has 
to be initiated – this initiative belongs to the national courts. Secondly, openness and sensitivity to the 
arguments provided by the other party of the dialogue is needed, the exchange between the European 
and national jurisdictions is not to be transformed into a ‘one-way message’ – this requirement should 
be addressed first of all to the European courts. 
 
Mixed beauty of the constitutional identity  
The disputes related to the possible coexistence between the national and the Charter standards of 
fundamental rights concentrate rather on the interpretation of Article 51(1) of the Charter and not on 
the question of constitutional identity. However, in this context it seems to be especially important to 
answer the question of what possibilities the Member States would have if they wanted to replace the 
application of the Charter standards with their own constitutional standards, when their ‘constitutional 
identity’ is at stake. Ever since the Melloni judgment34, the mere existence of a higher standard of a 
fundamental right in the national system is not a sufficient argument to refuse application of an 
established interpretation of a fundamental right standard, as interpreted by the ECJ and ECtHR, if this 
solution does not comply with the requirements of primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law. Would 
then the preservation of the constitutional identity be a good and sufficient argument? 
                                                     
32  The recent judgment in the case Digital Rights (joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12), judgment of 8 April 2014, on data 
retention by telecom companies, seems to illustrate that the analysis included in a judgment of a national constitutional 
court applying a fundamental right may precede an ECJ judgment. In the judgment on data retention the ECJ declared the 
EU directive invalid because it infringes the right to privacy. It was preceded by a judgment of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, which reviewed national regulations implementing EU law, which were found incompliant with the 
German Constitution (BVerfG, 1 BvR 256/08 from 2.3.2010). It could also be noted that judgments of national courts 
referring to the protection of the right to privacy in the context of data processing by the Internet search engines (as for 
example the judgment by LG Hamburg in Mosley case; 24.1.2014 - 324 O 264/11) preceded the ECJ judgment in case 
Google Spain and Google Inc. (C-131/12) above at (10). 
33  Cf. case Åkerberg Fransson (C-617/10), above at (5), (para. 29). 
34  Cf. case Melloni (C-399/11), above at (6). Regarding the conditions for the applicability of constitutional standards, see 
also Åkerberg Fransson (C-617/10), above at (5), (para. 29). 
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It is worth recalling that the identification of ‘constitutional traditions’ as representing the 
‘constitutional identity’ is an erroneous approach. Constitutional traditions of the Member States 
belong to the common heritage of European law and they are an essential component – as mentioned 
above – of the correct interpretation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter. In this sense 
the ‘constitutional identity’ is a specific sublimation of the common constitutional axiology  of the 
Member States which is one of the criteria used by the ECJ  in its interpretation of the content of the 
constitutional standards which should be respected in EU law.  
For these reasons Constitutional traditions do not equal constitutional identity. The former is a general 
and abstract concept being the synthesis of the trends in the legal systems of the Member States, 
whereas the latter is attributed to a specific legal system. The sources of the ‘constitutional identity’ 
are located in a normative idea of ‘national identity’35. The national identity constitutes an ‘added 
value’ to the idea of constitutional traditions and only jointly they constitute the constitutional 
identity
36
. 
There are certain crucial arguments in favour of respecting the specific constitutional values enshrined 
in the national legal systems. The European Union is created as a pluralistic organization and – as 
mentioned above – diversity is one of its strongest features37. Paradoxically, diversity in the EU is also 
the source of both strengths and weaknesses. As a matter of fact, on the one hand it ensures 
coexistence of different nations and cultures, but on the other hand it illustrates the fact that the 
process of the creation of a new and completely integrated European nation is complex and slow. The 
idea of constitutional identity expresses both of these faces of the pluralism of the EU. On the one 
hand, it potentially enhances flexibility in the application of EU rules and ensures better adaptation to 
the needs and specific culture of each Member State, but – on the other hand – it jeopardizes the 
coherent application of the Charter standards of fundamental rights. 
                                                     
35  Therefore, in this sense, ‘national identity’ is directly related to the fundamental structure of the state, also regarding its 
regional and local governmental structure. 
36  Art. 4(2) TEU states as follows: “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as 
their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and 
local self-government.(…)”.Cf. literature on constitutional identity, e.g. D. Ritleng, Propos introductifs in Le droit 
constitutionnel national aux prises avec le droit européen: l’exemple de la Hongrie, Revue des Affaires Européennes 
2013/3, Bruylant, 2014, pp. 441-445; S. L. Shaelou, ‘Nous les peuples’. L’identité constitutionnelle dans la jurisprudence 
tchèque, polonaise et lettone in L’identité constitutionnelle saisie par les juges en Europe, Cahiers Européens (1), Pedone, 
Paris 2011; V. Constantinesco, La confrontation entre identité constitutionnelle européenne et identité constitutionnelles 
nationales. Convergence ou contradiction ? Contrepoint ou hiérarchie ? in L’Union européenne: Mélanges en l’honneur 
du professeur P. Manin, 2010, pp. 79-94; B. Guastaferro, Beyond the ‘exceptionalism’ of constitutional conflicts: the 
‘ordinary’ functions of the identity clause, Yearbook of European Law, 31 (2012), pp. 263-318.  
37  Cf. K. Lenaerts, EU values and constitutional pluralism, as above at (29); and also Human Rights protection through 
judicial dialogue between national courts and the European Court of Justice, in Liberae Cogitationes, Liber amicorum 
Marc Bossuyt, (eds.) André Alen and others, Intersentia, Cambridge-Antwerp-Portland, 2013, pp. 367-377. In this matter 
cf. also N. Walker, The idea of constitutional pluralism, 3 The Modern Law Review (2002), p. 317.  
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No doubt, an unlimited and overly broad use of the idea of constitutional identity would become 
damaging for the very concept of EU law and it could even cause the collapse of the entire system. In 
particular, the risk would appear in two hypothetical situations.  
Firstly, if a constitutional court wished to act only as the ultimate jurisdictional arbitrator in 
establishing the borders imposed by the concept of the constitutional identity. It would de facto decide 
about admissibility of the implementation of European law into the national order.  
Secondly, the notion of constitutional identity would cover a very large spectrum of constitutional 
rules
38
  (in particular in the matter of the fundamental rights) including their interpretation in the 
constitutional jurisprudence
39
. A broad concept could for instance legitimize refusal to implement EU 
provisions or become a final defence argument, a specific ‘ultima ratio’ in the proceeding for failure 
of a Member State to fulfil obligations under the Treaty. In some sense, it would be a return to the 
situation pre-existing the cases of Internationale Handelsgesellschaft
 40
 or Costa v. E.N.E.L
41
. In fact, 
the principle of primacy of EU law would be evacuated.  
Nevertheless, I could not accept that the reference to the idea of constitutional identity would be 
subordinated to the same conditions which are generally required for the application of the national 
constitutional fundamental rights standards (meaning primacy, effectiveness and unity of EU law) as it 
has been stressed in the recent jurisprudence of the ECJ. We have to recall that these conditions have 
been settled on the basis of Art. 53 of the Charter, which concerns, inter alia, the relations between the 
fundamental rights standards guaranteed by the national constitutions and EU law, but it does not 
include a reference to the idea of constitutional identity. Finally, those judgments do not establish 
whether primacy, effectiveness and unity have ‘absolute significance’ and – consequently – whether 
they are applied also to the standards which are determined by the concept of the constitutional 
identity. In this sense the question could be treated as still being open.  
The solution has to be found between two ‘extremes’ i.e. absolute respect for the constitutional 
pluralism of the EU Member States and the fully integrated European legal space. It is not the first 
                                                     
38  According to this approach, each constitutional regulation carries the idea of national identity. It is worth noting that such 
an approach towards constitutional identity was criticized by the Advocate General P. Maduro in the opinion delivered on 
8 April 2008 in the case Michaniki (C-213/07) [2008] ECR I-9999, (para. 33) and also by the Advocate General N. Wahl 
in the opinion delivered on 10 April 2014 in the case Torresi (joined cases C-58/13 and C-59/13). For example, in the 
latter, the Italian court referred to the Italian national identity resulting from the Italian Constitution, which requires that a 
special state exam should be passed by the candidates who wish to be registered as Members of the Italian Bar. 
According to the Advocate General not any rule enshrined in a national constitution can limit the uniform application of 
EU provisions, let alone constitute a parameter for the legality of those rules (cf. para. 100). 
39  Cf. the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal on the Treaty of Lisbon (Polish Constitutional Court; judgment of 24 
November 2010, K 32/09, Treaty of Lisbon) and the position of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Judgment of 
30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, Treaty of Lisbon). Such a wide approach poses an obvious risk of confrontation, especially 
because it leaves out the fact that EU law has a constitutional consensus (e.g. the standard of individual fundamental 
rights as interpreted by the ECJ), which should be treated as a relevant point of reference when assessing the compliance 
of national solutions with EU law. Cf. also K. Lenaerts, EU values and constitutional pluralism, as above at (29).     
40  Cf. Judgment in case Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (C-11/70) [1970] ECR-1125.  
41  Judgment of 15 July 1964 in case Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L (C-6/64)) [1964] ECR-1141. 
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time that the EU legal order, or rather the idea of integration itself is confronted with challenges which 
require a combination of the components which seem to be, by their own nature, in opposition. 
However, it is an inherent feature of the EU legal space and the result of experience collected for over 
60 years that an apparently non-existent solution may be found through dialogue because of the will  
and  determination of all parties to find a consensus. The same mechanism shall be applied to the 
dispute between the ‘constitutional identity’ and the principle of primacy of EU law. The dialogue 
between national and European jurisdictions is a unique instrument in order to achieve consensus in 
this fragile matter.  
The Court’s jurisprudence has sent some signs which confirm that the idea of constitutional identity 
may be used as a ground for justification in the framework of the so-called derogation clauses. Even in 
the absence of any direct reference to constitutional identity, the Omega case
42
 (human dignity vs 
freedom to provide services) is one of the best examples. However other cases, such as Sayn-
Wittgenstein
43
 (republicanism vs free movement) or Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn44 (national language 
vs free movement) confirm the trend. The solutions in these cases are rather well received by the 
doctrine
45
. Generally the concept of application of the substantive values of the constitutional system 
through the use of the derogation clauses is largely accepted
46
. Nevertheless, the crucial point of the 
debate is who – and according to what criterion – should decide on the selection of the substantive 
components of the constitutional system. This is particularly so when only a very general definition of 
the constitutional identity of a Member State is provided by its constitutional doctrine or 
jurisprudence. 
I believe that an approach which makes a clear division between the European and national levels of 
jurisdiction and attributes competence in this matter to one or the other jurisdiction would be an 
unjustified simplification. Of course, national courts are in the best position to identify the elements of 
constitutional identity of a given Member State. No doubt, the characteristics of constitutional identity 
of a given Member State may not be set out discretionally in the ECJ jurisprudence. Reference to these 
                                                     
42  Judgment of 14 October 2004 in case Omega (C-36/02) [2004] ECR I-9609. 
43  Judgment of 22 December 2010 in case Sayn-Wittgenstein (C-208/09) [2010] ECR I-13693. 
44  Judgment of 12 May 2011 in case Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn (C-391/09) [2011] ECR I-3787. 
45  Cf. K. Lenaerts, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: scope of application and methods of interpretation in De Rome 
à Lisbonne: les juridictions de l’Union à la croisée des chemins, Mélanges en l’honneur de Paolo Mengozzi, Bruylant, 
2013, and also K. Lenaerts and J.A. Gutiérrez-Fons, The Place of the Charter in the EU constitutional edifice in The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights – A Commentary, (eds.) S. Peers and others, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon, 2014, pp. 1559-1593; A. von Bogdandy and S. Schill, Overcoming absolute primacy: Respect for national 
identity under the Lisbon Treaty in (48) Common Market Law Review 1417, (2011); V. Belling, Supranational 
fundamental rights or primacy of sovereignty? Legal effects of the so-called opt-out from the EU Charter, European Law 
Journal, n° 2, March 2012, pp. 254-255. 
46  One has to bear in mind that the derogation allowing for the application of different solutions in the national legal system 
cannot infringe the general principles of the EU law; Cf. the judgment in case ERT (C-260/89, 18 June 1991, I-2925), see 
also the Explanation relating to Art. 51 of the Charter [2007] OJ C303/17. However, this judgment did not concern the 
constitutional identity.   
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characteristics must be made by the national judges. However, this ‘national concept of the 
constitutional identity’ must be confronted with the goals and values of the European legal order. The 
search for the equilibrium between two legal orders belongs to the European judges. 
It has to be underlined that the values expressed in Art. 2 TEU may constitute – from an EU law 
perspective – the ‘ultimate line’ behind which the observance of the constitutional identity would 
become impossible
47
 because it should not reach the point where the axiological construction on which 
the European Union has been built, would be undermined. In other words, it is the constitutional 
identity of the European Union that should create the framework for the potential dialogue between 
the judges. European identity is not an abstract concept because it stems from the constitutional 
traditions of the Member States and the European Convention of Human Rights
48
. The space to look 
for common points is therefore quite large and it is this aspect which provides for the strength and the 
sense of the judicial dialogue. 
This ideal of a rational equilibrium will never be reached without a dialogue and a necessary degree of 
openness manifested by the parties of the debate. I strongly believe that the framework for this 
dialogue has been well determined by the values and axiology which are expressed by the formula of 
Article 2 TEU and which have been shared by all the courts participating in the debate. Instead of 
continuing a never ending debate about ‘which court is the court of the last word’, rationality requires 
focussing the debate on the real issues and, above all, on the question of what kind of European Union 
is needed in the future. 
                                                     
47  In this sense, it is sometimes debated whether the concept of constitutional identity of the European Union could provide 
a basis for the application of a ‘reverse Solange-like’ reasoning, which would delineate – with reference to national legal 
orders – the borders outside which national solutions would be an ultra vires form in respect to EU law. It would allow 
for an adequate reaction to the risk of authoritarian trends that might occur in some Member States. Cf. M. Kumm in a 
panel discussion: In the Era of legal pluralism. The relationship between the EU, national and international courts, and 
the interplay of the multiple sources of law, at FIDE Congress in Copenhagen, May 2014. Apart from the constitutional 
identity context, the supposition based on the assumption that each national legal system observes the fundamental rights, 
may be overturned. For example in the N.S. judgment, above at (3), the ECJ evaluated the practice of national authorities 
in the procedures applied to refugees. 
48  Cf. also B. de Witte, Article 53, Level of protection in The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – A Commentary, (eds.) S. 
Peers et al., Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2014, pp. 1523-1538, who says: “In interpreting the relevant 
provisions of the Charter, the Court of Justice and the courts of the Member States must have due regard to the level of 
protection offered by similar rights contained in international human rights conventions such as the ECHR and in the 
common constitutional traditions of the member states.” 
  
 
